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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
GEORGE K. COMISH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from two convictions of 
unlawful distribution of a controlled substance for value, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(1) (a) (1953, as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried before the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson, Jr. sitting without a jury, and a verdict of 
guilty was returned. A judgment and sentence of conviction 
was entered on that verdict. 
Case Nos. 
14824 
14825 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an Order of this Court affirming 
the judgment of the Court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter was tried on stipulated facts. 
Counsel stipulated that on September 16r 197 5, and on 
October 25, 1975 appellant did distribute for value a 
controlled substance, marijuana, to Terry Wright (R. 47). 
An envelope containing the marijuana was admitted into 
evidence. It was further stipulated that Terry Wright 
was an officer of the University of Utah Police Department 
who was working for and under the direction of Larry Hedburg, 
his supervisor at the University of Utah Police Department 
and a special deputy of the Salt Lake County Sheriff. 
The distribution for value occurred at an address not 
located on the University of Utah's property, but within 
Salt Lake County. Appellant moved the Court to dismiss 
the information because they were based on the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice, and the Court denied the 
motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
OFFICER WRIGHT WAS NOT AN ACCOMPLICE WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-31-18 (1953 AS AMENDED); 
THEREFORE HIS TESTIMONY NEED NOT BE CORROBORATED TO SUSTAIN 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
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A. Officer Wright was operating within his 
jurisdiction as a peace officer» 
Utah Code Ann* § 53-45-5 (1953, as amended) 
provides in part that: 
"Members of the police or 
security department of any state 
institution of higher education 
shall . . . be peace officers and 
shall also have all of the powers 
possessed by policemen in cities and 
by sheriffs, . . . providing, however, 
that such powers may be exercised only 
in cities and counties in which such 
institutions, its branches or 
properties are located and only in 
connection with acts occurring on the 
property of such institution or when 
required for the protection of its 
interests, property, students or 
employees; and otherwise within such 
counties when specifically requested 
by the state or local law enforcement 
officials having jurisdiction," 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellant contends that Officer Wright was acting 
outside of the authority granted to University police 
officers by this statute when he attempted to obtain 
evidence of unlawful sales of marijuana off of the University 
campus. In support of his contention, the appellant cites 
State in the Interest of Hurley, 28 U.2d 248, 501 P.2d 
111 (1972), where this Court held that the exception in the 
above cited statute that allows University police to patrol 
"when required for the protection of its interest?, property, 
students, or employees" only authorized patrol under some 
type of exigent circumstances where the direct and immediate 
interests of the institution are involved. 
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The Hurley case, however, did not deal with the 
other circumstance where the statute allows a University 
police officer to exercise authority off of the campus, 
i.e. "when specifically requested by the state or local 
law enforcement officials having jurisdiction." In this 
case, Officer Wright was at all times acting under the 
direction of Special Deputy Htedburg, a local official 
having jurisdiction to enforce the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act throughout Salt Lake County. Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-9 (1953, as amended). Consequently, Officer 
Wrightfs actions were squarely within the language 
of the statute, and did not exceed the authority granted 
him by Utah Code Ann. § 53-45-5 (1953, as amended). 
Alternatively, Officer Wrightfs actions were not 
in excess of his authority under the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-36 (Supp. 1975). Appellant has contented 
that the statute does not apply to University police 
officers because they are not "peace officers duly 
authorized by any governmental entity of this state." 
However, as Utah Code Ann. § 53-45-5 (1953, as amended) 
makes clear, University police officers are authorized 
as peace officers by the State of Utah (although they are 
appointed by the University). Assuming that the University 
did authorize its own police officers, those officers would 
still be within the ambit of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-36 (Supp. 
197 5) because State institutions of higher education are 
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"political subdivisions" of the State• Utah Code Ann. 
§ 53-45-6 (1953, as amended). Respondent respectfully 
submits that Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-36 (Supp. 1975) 
is in full force to define when a University police 
officer may exercise a peace officerfs authority beyond 
the limits of his normal jurisdiction. Subsection 1(b) 
of the statute states that an officer may exercise 
authority out of his jurisdiction when an offense 
is committed in the office's presence. Appellant asks 
this court to narrow the application of this section to 
offenses which the officer observes by happenstance, 
but has cited no authority and given no cogent reason 
for such a restrictive^reading. Respondent submits 
that the language and intent of the statute is clear, 
and that officers may exercise authority in connection 
with any offense committed in their presence, whether 
or not they have provided the opportunity for the offense 
to be committed. 
Subsection 1(d) of the statute again authorizes 
an extrajurisdictional exercise of authority when the 
officer is requested to assist local peace officers. 
Appellant claims the subsection is inapplicable because 
Deputy Hedburg is not a local law enforcement officer, 
but a member of a University Police Department sworn 
to act as a local law enforcement officer. This is a 
distinction without a difference. Deputy Hedburg is a 
duly authorized local peace officer, and his employment Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at the University of Utah Police Department does not 
deprive him of his authority. 
Finally, appellant argues that both of the 
above exceptions are inapplicable because Officer Wright 
failed to meet the notification requirements of 
subsection (2) of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-36 (Supp. 1975). 
Assuming for the purposes of argument that notification 
is absolutely required in order to authorize the officer's 
actions, Office Wright did notify and report back to 
Deputy Hedburg in connection with his investigation of 
the appellant. This establishes substantial compliance 
with the requirement that "the local law enforcement 
authority" be notified. 
Because Officer Wright purchased the marijuana 
pursuant to his duty as an officer, he is not criminally 
liable as an accomplice. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-15(3) 
(1953, as amended). There'is consequently no need to 
corroborate his testimony in order to sustain appellant's 
conviction. State v. Serrell, 11 Or. App. 324, 501 P.2d 
1324 affirmed 265 Ore. 216 508 P. 2d 1405 (1972).. 
B. Officer Wright was the agent of a duly 
authorized officer, and only feigned participation in the 
crime in order to procure evidence against the appellant. 
-6-
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Appellant's argument that Officer Wright is 
an accomplice is premised on the notion that anyone 
who knowingly participates in a crime is an accomplice 
regardless of their intent, unless they are a police 
officer. This ignores a fundamental premise of the 
criminal law; that no person is guilty of a crime unless 
he acts with criminal intent. Officer Wright's intent 
was not to participate in an unlawful sale of marijuana, 
but to procure evidence of the unlawful sale. Thus, 
Officer Wright's actions were justified and not 
punishable under law. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-401 (Supp. 
1975) provides that an actor's conduct is justified 
when the act "is reasonable and in fulfillment of 
[the actor's] duties as a governmental officer or 
employee. . . . " or when the conduct is justified for any 
other reason under the laws of the State. 
The legislature has indicated that an intent 
to procure evidence is not a criminal intent. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-303 (Supp. 1975) provides that: 
"Entrapment occurs when a law 
enforcement officer or a person 
directed by or acting in cooperation 
with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order 
to obtain evidence of the 
commission for prosecution. . . . " 
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The statute demonstrates that an agent acting on behalf 
of the police department is so closely associated with 
law enforcement that his inducement of a crime is a 
defense to the person induced. The legislature did 
not intend to provide a defense to a person induced 
to commit a crime by an accomplice as criminally 
liable as himself. If Officer Wright had induced the 
commission of the crime, the appellant could clearly 
have claimed the defense of entrapment. It would be 
anomalous to state that Officer Wright was so closely 
linked with the police that his inducement of a crime 
renders it no crime at all, and that he is so closely 
linked with the appellant that his criminal guilt is 
identical to his, making him an accomplice whose testimony 
must be viewed with deep suspicion. The intent necessary 
to make out the defense of entrapment, i.e. the intent 
"to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution" 
is clearly not a criminal intent. 
It appears to be the unanimous opinion of Courts 
that have considered the problem that an agent, operating 
under the direction of a police officer in an attempt 
to obtain evidence of a crime, is not an accomplice 
of a criminal defendant, and no corroboration of his 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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testimony is required to sustain a conviction. State 
v, Acosta, 101 Ariz. 127, 416 P.2d 560 (1966) and State 
v. Runge, 233 N.W.2d 321 (S.D. 1975). Also compare 
State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972), 
where this Court held that a police agent who was not 
an officer was not the accomplice of a seller of narcotic 
drugs. 
Respondent submits that the fact that Officer 
Wright purchased the marijuana in an effort to enforce 
the law negates any criminal intent on his part, justifies 
his conduct and demonstrates that he was not appellant's 
accomplice. 
C. The buyer of a controlled substance is not 
the accomplice of the seller. 
In the Kasai case supra, this Court held that a 
purchaser of a controlled substance is not an accomplice 
of a person who distributes a controlled substance for 
value in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a). 
Appellant has attempted to avoid the ruling of this case 
by pointing out that it was not decided under the present 
statutory formulation that defines when a person is 
criminally responsible for the conduct of another• The 
present formulation is found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(Supp. 1975). 
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"Every person. . . who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes 
an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct." 
The Kasai case was decided under the terms of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-1-44 (1953) (repealed). 
"All persons concerned in the 
commission of a crime. . • whether 
they directly commit the act con-
stituting the offense or aid and 
abet its commission or, not being 
present, have advised and encouraged 
its commission* . . are principals 
in any crime so committed." 
Although the present law contains some terms 
not found in the former statute (solicits, requests), it 
is hard to determine why it expands the criminal liability 
of a buyer over the former statute. A willing buyer aids 
and encourages the seller in making a sale, yet a buyer,:] 
was held not an accomplice of the seller under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-44 (1953) (repealed). There is no reason 
to believe that the language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(Supp. 1975) was meant to change that result. 
In fact, the language of the present statute 
appears to have been drawn from ALI, Model Penal Code, Tentative 
Draft No. 1 (1953) § 2.04(3) (pg. 11). 
"A person is an accomplice of 
another person in commission of a 
crime if with the purpose of promoting 
or facilitating the commission of crime 
he commanded, requested, encouraged, 
or provoked such other person to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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commit or aided, agreed to aid, 
or attempted to aid such other 
person. . . . " 
The drafters of this language commented: 
"Should the man who has intercourse 
with a prostitute be viewed as an 
accomplice in the act of prostitution, 
the purchaser an accomplice in the 
unlawful sale, . . . ? 
These are typical situations where 
conflicting policies and strategies, 
or both, are involved in determining 
whether the normal principles of 
accessorial accountability ought to 
apply. One factor that has weighed 
with some state courts is that 
affirming liability makes applicable 
the requirement that testimony be 
corroborated; the consequence may be 
to diminish rather than enhance the 
law's effectiveness by making any 
convictions unduly difficult. . . 
To seek a systematic legislative 
resolution of these issues seems a 
hopeless effort; the problem must be 
faced and weighed as it arises in each 
situation. What is common to these 
cases is, however, that the question 
is before the legislature when it defines 
the individual offense involved. . . • 
• It is proposed, therefore, that in 
such cases the general section on 
complicity be made inapplicable, leaving 
to the definition of the crime itself 
the selective judgment that must be 
made. If legislators know that buyers 
will not be viewed as accomplices in 
sales unless the statute indicates that 
this behavior is included in the pro-
hibition, they will focus on the problem 
as they frame the definition of the crime." 
ALI, Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 
/.-•-• (1953) (per.. 35,36). 
In sum, the originators of the language used in 
the present statute recognized the limits of a general 
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definition of an accomplice. In certain circumstances, 
specifically including unlawful sales, the drafters 
recommended that the specific ptatute that defines the 
crime control the liability of the parties involved. 
In this case, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953 as amended) 
clearly differentiates the criminal liability of a 
buyer and seller of a controlled substance. Subsection 
(1) of the act makes it unlawful to produce, dispense or 
distribute for value a controlled substance and pre-
scribes the punishments for persons who commit those 
acts. Subsection (2) states that it is unlawful to 
possess or use a controlled substance and provides a 
different schedule of penalties for those prohibited 
acts. Nearly every person who possesses a controlled 
substance comes into possession by purchase or gift, 
but if all of these possessors were punishable as 
accomplices under subsection (1), subsection (2) would , 
be surplusage. The legislative intent is to punish those 
who buy differently from those who sell. Consequently, 
a buyer's testimony need not be corroborated to sustain 
a conviction for the unlawful sale of a controled sub-
stance. 
This result is consistent with this Court's 
prior holdings on separate criminal offenses that are 
inextricably connected. In addition to the Kasai case, 
supra, see State v. Davie, 121 Utah 184, 240 P.2d 263 
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(1952) holding that a person who resorts to a house 
of ill fame is not the accomplice of one who keeps 
a house of ill fame, even though both offenses were 
defined in the same statute and not separated into 
subdivisions. See also State v. McGee, 26 U.2d 373, 
489 P.2d 1188 (1971), holding that a person who commits 
perjury is not the accomplice of a person who suborns 
the perjury, and State v. Cragun, 8 5 Utah 149, 38 
P.2d 1071 (1934) holding that the woman upon whom an 
abortion is performed is not the accomplice of the 
person inducing the miscarriage. The rule that the 
buyer of a narcotic is not the accomplice of the seller 
prevails in other jurisdictions. State v. Christensen, 
474 P.2d 282 (Or. App. 1970); Lujan v. State, 85 Nev. 
16, 449 P.2d 244 (1969). 
Respondent submits that the buyer of a controlled 
substance is not an accomplice of the seller. 
D. Assuming Officer Wright is criminally 
responsible for appellant's acts, he is still not an 
"accomplice" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 
(1953). 
In State v. McDonald, 26 U.2d 336, 489 P.2d 
434 (1971), this Court stated that: 
-13-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"[I]t is interesting to note 
that statutorily our State has not 
defined an 'accomplice1/ the matter 
having been left to the decisions 
of the courts, text writers, etc." 
26 U.2d at 337 n.l. 
Appellant's brief proceeds on the premise that if a 
person is criminally responsible for the conduct of 
another, he is an accomplice. Assuming that an in-
former-buyer is criminally liable for a seller's con-
duct under a broad reading of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(Supp, 197 5) f a buyer-informer would still not meet the 
test announced by this Court in State v. Georgopoulos, 
27 U.2d 53, 492 P.2d 1353 (1972). 
"In order for one to be an 
accomplice it must be shown that 
he knowingly, voluntarily, and 
with common intent with the principal 
offender, united in the commission 
of a crime. . . . " 
27 U.2d at 55. 
In deciding whether to reverse a conviction because it 
is based on the testimony of an "accomplice", this Court 
should look to the rationale of the statute rather than 
apply a mechanical test. As one commentator has said: 
"The Court should interpret the 
term 'accomplice' in light of the 
objectives of the corroboration 
statute, and not require that the 
witness fall exactly within the 
criminal code definition of the term 
for the purpose of a possible pros-
ecution of the witness for the same 
crime as the defendant." 1972 Utah 
LR 60, 68. 
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The purpose of the statute is to protect a criminal 
defendant from being convicted upon evidence that is 
inherently unreliable. Balanced against this interest 
of the defendant is society's right to be free from 
needless restrictions on the prosecution and punish-
ment of criminals. In the Kasai case, supra, this 
Court decided that a buyer's testimony is not so 
suspect that it cannot convict a seller of drugs. 
Respondent submits that this is a sound precedent, parti-
cularly under the facts of this case. Counsel has 
stipulated that appellant committed the crime with 
which he was charged, and there is consequently no 
possibility that the appellant is being unjustly 
accused. As this Court stated in State v. McGee, 26 U.2d 
373, 489 P.2d 1188: 
"The rule (of corroboration) 
is intended to prevent scurrilous 
prosecution, but the rule has no 
application where the accused admits 
on the stand, on the trial for the 
offense that he has committed the 
offense. . . His admission obviates 
any need for protection from malicious 
prosecution," (Emphasis in original) 
26 U.2d at 375 quoting from State v.• 
Johnson, 141 Mont. 1, 374 P.2d 
504 (1962). , 
Respondent submits that appellant's conviction 
is based on reliable evidence, and in the interest of 
justice, the conviction should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above* points and authorities, 
respondent submits that Officer Wright's testimony 
was sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction, and 
urges this Court to affirm the conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
